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MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Council

SUBJECT : Report of Working Group on Operations
Centers, Information Flows, etc.

1. Attached herewith is the Working Group report.
A second report will deal with the reports function.

2. We recommend the transformation of the present
Operations Center into a true Operations Center, using
the full data-processing facilities of the Agency as they
develop. Our concept is summarized in Paragraph 2 of the
report. Our specific recommendations for a phased ap-
proach are in Paragraphs 17-21.

3. We are agreed on our recommendations as they
stand, but we believe there is an issue which the Manage-
ment Council itself should decide. Paragraph 2 of the report
speaks of "monitoring". The Council should decide whether
this should be "command", "control", "supervise", "monitor",
"be cognizant of" or whatever. The problem is not semantic;
it is whether the Deputies want to impose a command struc-
ture, however nominal, over their various non-duty hours
activities. An orderly mind would argue that there should

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be such a structure, but the rebuttal is that we have gone along very well without. My personal view is that the present arrangement would suffice if we never had to face another major crisis, but October 1962 should have taught us that pedestrian arrangements won't hold up under real stress.

4. We recognize the bind on space. It is clear that recommendation 18j can only be carried out by displacing SAVA.

5. The Report has four annexes.

--Annex A is our charter from the Management Council.

--Annex B is the notebook containing an inventory of Agency centers and their inter-relations.

--Annex C is an initial estimate of resource requirements.

Annex D contains specific recommendations for disposition of the Agency's secondary 24-hour centers.

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Report of Study Group on Operations Centers

1. The Study Group was charged with examining Agency 24-hour activities and related message flows with a view to consolidation and rationalization. (See Annex A) Our recommendations are contained in this report. A separate report will deal with the role of the "reports" function in handling Agency-collected raw intelligence.

2. We took as our objective the creation of a 24-hour system which would provide a single, central point for:

--Scanning of electrical narrative traffic arriving in Headquarters from all sources for items of immediate concern.

--Alerting of senior Agency officials, action officers, and external consumers.

(This function, of course, is usually carried out through command channels during duty hours.)

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- Selection of important traffic for senior Agency officers.
- Response to queries from other government agencies when no established channel exists.
- Crisis management and task force activities.
- Monitoring of all Agency activities in non-duty hours.

Present Arrangements

3. By this yardstick, the present situation is not too bad. The Agency has a number of more or less autonomous duty officers and other activities, but cooperation among them is good. The present Operations Center: scans most incoming traffic; alerts some Agency officers and most external consumers; selects some important traffic, is the point of reference for other agencies; houses DDI crisis activities but not those of DDO; monitors most Agency 24-hour activities but controls none. More important, however, is the fact that all these activities take place within the traditional framework

of the Agency; the individual baronies preserve their
frontiers.

4. The Operations Center is the most comprehensive and most nearly "central" of the Agency's 24-hour activities. The DDI is executive agent for the Operations Center. DDI and DDO have duty officers there. Each answers to his Deputy; the DDI officer, as the senior, represents the DCI to a limited, but undefined, degree. Each is generally cognizant of most out-of-hours activities of his Directorate. The DDI officer in addition controls some housekeeping functions of the DDM&S.

5. In addition to the Operations Center, there are nine other centers with a total shift strength of nearly 100 three stand-by centers, and three computer centers, in addition to house-keeping functions. Of the nine, four (IW, FMSAC, SSOC) are highly specialized processing facilities that make their results available to the Operations Center. Two (OSP and NPIC Signal Centers) are independent duty facilities. NSO is a support function that cooperates with the Center. Two, the Signal Center and Cable Secretariat, receive and route traffic to all the others except

NSO. Several are located with their parent component away from the Headquarters Building. (An inventory of these centers is included as Annex B)

6. There is no obvious duplication of functions among these centers, although several of them may deal with the same traffic. There is, however, a division of the scanning, alerting, and selection functions among several centers.

--Scanning is done in the Operations Center and FMSAC by broadly qualified substantive officers, aware of current activities on an all-source basis; in Cable Secretariat, IW and by substantive officers with limited access to other information; and in the other centers by technicians working by SOP.

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--The Operations Center selects from NSA and press traffic; Cable Secretariat from CIA, State and DOD traffic; OSP and NPIC from "project" traffic.

--Alerting of the DDO is divided among the DDO/DO in the Operations Center, IW, and Cable Duty Officer; of the DDI between Operations Center and

NPIC; of the DDS&T among OSP, OSA
(when active), FMSAC, and SSOC; of
the DDM&S among the Operations Center,
NSO, and Cable Duty Officer.

At no one point is there full knowledge of what is going on, and there is ample room for matters to fall between two stools.

7. Some of the anomalies noted above are historical carry-overs. Others are the results of compartmentation. Compartmentation is necessary for some of the operational traffic of the DDO, and DDS&T. Protection must be given to sensitive intelligence collected by other agencies. There must be privacy for the personal concerns of the DCI, and for the medical and security activities of the DDM&S. To meet these requirements, there has grown up a maze of improvised special procedures for particular categories of sensitive traffic. No two are alike and no one element is aware of them all. Such a system maintains security, but at a considerable cost to efficiency. Eight years experience with the co-location and cooperation of the DDI and DDO Duty Officers, however, demonstrates that an Operations Center can do its job while maintaining compartmentation. But the more cable traffic is shared, the less chance of error.

8. Another weakness of the present system has been surmounted in the past largely by good will. This is the lack of clearly defined relationships among the centers. During duty hours the Agency has an established chain of command, but when senior officers are not on board its various parts operate with relative autonomy. The Operations Center is first among equals, but its relations with the others are largely consultative. The DDI and DDO duty officers speak (within certain limits) for their Deputies at night. No one speaks for the DCI or for the other Deputies. ✓

New Considerations

9. The DCI has stated his desire to integrate the activities of the Agency, and to eliminate barriers between Directorates. Present arrangements do not serve his purposes.

10. The DCI has ordered a much more intensive effort in support of the NSC Staff and the White House Situation Room. To achieve this, the OCI PDB Staff, located in the Operations Center, has been expanded and redesignated White House Support Staff. Its activities are hampered, however, because the Operations Center as now constituted cannot provide the full information flow it requires. Moreover, present

Agency methods for transmission to the White House are not compatible with the WHSR data-handling system.

11. The Agency is developing a consolidated, computer-based system for dissemination of narrative electrical traffic within Headquarters. Its advent will provide an opportunity for rationalization of the 24-hour activity complex.

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13. The NMCC/NMIC and State Operations Centers are in process of modernization and will soon be a generation ahead of the CIA Operations Center. To stay in the game CIA must modernize too.

14. In response the Agency has developed, and is preparing to put forward for National Security Council approval, a proposal for a National Intelligence Operations Center. The primary purpose of NIOC is to pull together Community current intelligence support for the national authorities. It will obviously benefit from and contribute to the other developments listed above. ✓

Conclusions

15. We believe the Agency needs a true centralized Operations Center. We believe it is feasible to modify the present system immediately to bring this about in a somewhat jerry-rigged fashion. Finally, we believe that over the next 2-3 years the center can and should be transformed into a modern computer-based facility.

16. Taking the initial steps can be done cheaply. The subsequent ones, however, will cost money, space, and a modest increase in personnel. Much of the costs would have been incurred in any case, however, because what we propose is largely to move existing functions rather than to create new ones. (A preliminary estimate of resources is included as Annex C.)

Recommendations

17. Our recommendations are listed in five categories: steps to be taken now to achieve a quick fix; studies to be undertaken now; changes necessary in the existing NIOC proposal; steps to be taken in a second phase of development; a third and final phase in which computer-based systems are fully incorporated. Both recommendations and the resource estimates in Annex C decrease in specificity with time.

18. We recommend that the following steps be taken in the first 90 days after approval of this report.

- a. That DDI remain Executive Agent for the Operations Center; that the DDI Duty Officer be senior in non-duty hours.
- b. That DDS&T and DDM&S place duty officers in the present Operations Center, at least during off-duty hours.
- c. That each Directorate duty officer be responsible for activities of and alerting in his Directorate. (For relations with other centers see Annex D.) That the DDI Duty

Officer normally be responsible for the needs of the DCI and DDCI in non-duty hours.

d. That during crisis periods a senior Agency duty officer representing the DCI be placed over the four Directorate duty officers.

e. That Cable Secretariat make available to at least one Directorate duty officer all incoming narrative traffic (after screening out low precedence and administrative cables); that the duty officers maintain necessary compartmentation.

f. That State NODIS and Roger Channel traffic, the only important category not usually received electrically, be routed through the appropriate duty officers in the Operations Center by LDX, if State will agree.

g. That the alerting and "call-in" functions of the Cable Duty Officer and the OSP Signal Center (?) be transferred to the appropriate Directorate duty officers in the Operations Center.

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h. That all selection functions, including those of the Cable Secretariat, be moved to the Operations Center; that the volume of cables selected be reduced; that the Night Journal and Cable Summary be combined, and issued on an all-source basis 2 or 3 times daily.

i. That to the extent possible with present facilities all dissemination within the Headquarters Building be transferred to Cable Secretariat/Signal Center.

j. That approximately 3,000 square feet of additional space adjacent to the Operations Center be made available as soon as possible.

k. If this space is on the 6th floor, that a connecting staircase be constructed as soon as arrangements can be made.

l. That the Agency obtain inter-Agency agreement on NIOC.

19. While these steps are underway, study should begin on the following problems in the design of a future Operations Center.

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- a. Should FMSAC and SSOC be physically consolidated with the Operations Center?
- b. How should the Headquarters terminal of the be configured and staffed?
- c. How should the Agency, or NIOC, manage the interaction of collection systems?
- d. How to adapt CDS to an Operations Center fully meeting the objectives of Paragraph 2, and make it compatible with the systems of the WHSR, NMCC, and State Operations Center?

/I9a. Changes in NIOC/

20. The additional space will make it possible to move into Phase II. In Phase II we assume that NIOC has been approved. Thus the additional space will be used for:

- a. Offices and communications for inter-Directorate and inter-Agency crisis task forces.
- b. Offices for State, DIA, and NSA permanent representatives.
- c. Moving the IW into the Operations Center, where its officers can be more aware of the substantive environment.

21. Phase III is based on CDS. The design of a modern Operations Center should take into account the studies proposed in Paragraph 19, the evolution of the Agency, and the advance of technology in the meanwhile. At the least, we should attempt to develop now the design of an information handling system and the requirements for space and personnel that a modern center would require. We should establish FY76 as a target for such a center, and move steadily toward it.

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